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Economic Participation  
Rights and the  
All-Afected principle
ANNETTE 
ZIMMERMANN
Abstract: The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has 
democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to 
this problem is the all-affected principle (AAP), according to which a polity ought 
to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in 
a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic 
enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to 
economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself to AAP, one 
must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights are not 
necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best, way to protect morally weighty 
interests. I also argue that economic participation rights raise important worries 
about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise must be constrained 
by a number of moral duties. 
Keywords: all-affected principle; democratic boundary problem; economic 
participation; non-citizens; transnational democratic inclusion.

Introduction
Who has democratic participation rights in a given polity, and why? This question is 
known as the democratic boundary problem.1 One possible solution to this problem 
is the all-affected principle (AAP), according to which a polity ought to enfranchise 
all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally 
significant way. Since AAP implies that existing polities2 ought to enfranchise non-
citizens if their interests are affected, the justification of democratic participation 
rights conferred under AAP is thus citizenship-independent: whether a person 
possesses a particular legal status is simply not decisive for the question whether 
she ought to have a voice in a democratic decision.3
1   It is impossible to do the vast extent of literature on this topic justice in a footnote, but for some of the most influential 
discussions of this problem, see Frederick G. Whelan, ‘Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,’ in 
J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.) NOMOS XXV, Vol. 25: Liberal Democracy (NYU Press, 1983), 13-
47; Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989); Robert E. Goodin, ‘Enfranchising All 
Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 35/1 (2007), 40-68; David Miller, ‘Democracy’s 
Domain,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 37/3 (2009), 201-228.
2   For the purposes of this paper, I use AAP to address the question who has participation rights in existing polities, 
and thus take them as given. However, AAP could also be used as a heuristic device in order to determine latent 
constituencies which ought to form new polities.
3   Here, it is important to distinguish between enfranchisement principles which justify that a person A has a right 
to participate in all decisions being taken in a specific polity, and principles which justify that A has a right to 
participate in a particular decision – or set of decisions – which affects her morally weighty interests as specified 
in the subsequent section. AAP plausibly supports only the latter, and thus differs from ‘blanket enfranchisement’ 
principles which justify participation rights on the grounds that A is a citizen or a co-national. This is why AAP is best 
construed as citizenship-independent and nationality-independent. 
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My core claim in this paper is that while AAP offers a plausible principle of 
democratic enfranchisement if it specifies clearly which affected interests are 
morally weighty enough to justify participation rights, its supporters have so 
far not paid sufficient attention to participatory practices that depart from the 
standard picture of political participation (voting, running for office, peaceful 
demonstrations). In particular, they have paid barely any attention to economic 
participation rights. This is particularly troubling in light of the fact that many 
of the ways in which a citizen or non-citizen can be affected occur within 
economic relationships. Having developed this position in the first two sections 
of this paper, I subsequently go on to argue that, if one commits oneself to 
AAP, one must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights 
(X
P
) are not necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best way, to protect 
morally weighty interests. Whenever this is the case, AAP necessarily demands 
the conferral of economic participation rights (X
E
), which I define as the set of 
rights which enable their holder A to participate in democratic decisions either 
by using economic resources to voice political preferences of any kind (e.g. 
boycotts, campaign funding); or by voicing political preferences specifically 
about the use of economic resources, either within an economic relationship 
(e.g. strikes in a corporation) or within a political forum (e.g. participatory 
budgeting in a public assembly). While one might not always find empirical 
examples for the transnational conferral of all of these rights – that is, the 
conferral of X
E
 to non-citizens who are also non-residents – my view is that if 
one is committed to AAP, one must also think that the transnational conferral 
of X
E
 is morally required ideally speaking, as long as other central conditions 
of AAP obtain. The lack of empirical examples for some of these modes of 
transnational democratic inclusion is thus not in itself a reason to reject AAP; in 
fact, they highlight AAP’s usefulness as a heuristic device for identifying urgent 
priorities for policy change.4
I conclude my argument in the fourth section of this paper by pointing out how 
X
E
 raise unique worries about the potentially unforeseeable and unaccountable 
political impact of democratic participation. This undermines AAP’s goal of 
protecting the morally weighty interests of rights-holders. Hence, I argue that 
AAP supporters must endorse not only the view that AAP demands the conferral 
of X
E
, but also the view that AAP entails duties which constrain the scope of X
E
 
in a way that prevents internal inconsistency within AAP: a duty of accountable 
public justification, and a duty not to intentionally and foreseeably misuse X
E
 in 
an unjust or exploitative way.
4   Whether an ideal transnational distribution of X
E
 would be feasible given currently existing state institutions is a 
separate question, and one which I will bracket here.
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Which Affected Interests Are Relevant for AAP? 
Morally Significant Interests in Autonomy and Wellbeing
AAP is deeply controversial: why would anyone think that a person A has 
participation rights because her interests are affected? Clearly, not just anything 
that is in A’s interest qualifies as morally weighty enough to justify the conferral 
of rights to have a say in decisions that significantly shape the lives of others. 
Trivial, unreasonable, or morally wrong subjective preferences cannot count as 
relevant for any plausible reading of AAP.
So which interests are morally weighty enough to count for AAP? As other 
contributors to the debate on AAP have proposed,5 it is plausible to think that 
the class of morally weighty interests encompasses both the interest in wellbeing 
and the interest in autonomy. 
Regarding the former, it is tempting to define the interest in wellbeing as 
narrowly as possible in order to highlight its moral weight. This could be done, 
for instance, by restricting the interest in wellbeing to a basic needs account. But 
while basic needs constitute an important part of a person A’s morally weighty 
interest in wellbeing, there are many cases in which A is affected in a morally 
significant way while her basic needs remain satisfied, such as when B exploits A 
by taking unfair advantage of A’s skills, but does not prevent her from accessing 
food and shelter. It is obvious that A’s interest in wellbeing is still (adversely) 
affected here because A has a diminished ability to pursue her conception of 
wellbeing on her own terms.6 In section II, I will elaborate further on different 
types of cases in which persons count as relevantly affected under AAP without 
the satisfaction of their basic needs being at stake. For now, I define the interest 
in wellbeing as an interest that encompasses both the satisfaction of A’s basic 
needs, and A’s ability to pursue her own conception of wellbeing.7
Similarly, the morally weighty interest in autonomy ought not to be construed 
too narrowly either: meaningful autonomy requires more than simply choosing 
5   Both Carol Gould and Mark Warren (independently) define fundamental interests in the context of AAP as our 
interest in ‘self-determination [which encompasses autonomy] and self-development [which plausibly includes at 
least basic wellbeing].’ See Mark E. Warren, ‘The All Affected Interests Principle in Democratic Theory and Practice,’ 
IHS Political Science Series Working Paper 145 (June 2017), p. 3; Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human 
Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p. 178; 197. As Gould helpfully clarifies, ‘a person is [...] importantly affected [...] 
not [...] only if the decision deprives people of civil rights or threatens their person but also applies if it would deprive 
them of the opportunity to gain means of subsistence’ (ibid., p. 212). The view that self-determination encompasses 
wellbeing has also been articulated by Iris Marion Young: ‘Self-development in this sense certainly entails meeting 
people’s needs for food, shelter, health care, and so on.’ See Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 
2002), p. 32.
6   In Iris Young’s words, ‘While the distribution of resources [...] is a central issue for the value of self-development, 
this value also raises questions about the institutional organization of power, status and communication in ways not 
reducible to distributions.’ (Young, 2002, p. 32).
7   I am not claiming that a person’s interest in wellbeing consists in actually achieving whatever wellbeing-related 
outcome she subjectively wants to achieve. I am merely claiming that having the ability to pursue her subjective 
conception of wellbeing is in her interest, whether she exercises this ability or not.
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from a set of available options; it also requires the ability to develop and 
pursue one’s own conception of the good. As Raz argues, an ‘adequate range of 
options’8 is only one of three conditions for having autonomy. One also must be 
independent from coercion and manipulation, and one must possess ‘adequate 
mental abilities.’9 If we restrict a person’s autonomy, or her ability to make 
autonomous decisions, without an appropriate justification, we morally wrong 
her pro tanto (although perhaps not all things considered), even if we do not 
harm her physically or mentally. 
By this, I do not mean that A’s interests are affected in a way that is relevant 
to AAP if A does, or does not, succeed in obtaining outcomes or achieving 
goals that A herself has articulated by using her capabilities of autonomy. This 
claim would be too broad, it implies the – implausibly inclusive – view that 
A’s interest in autonomy is always relevantly affected – by any law or policy 
that is in some way related to A’s goals. The more precise and plausible view is 
the one that I have set out here: ‘It is in A’s interest to be autonomous’ means 
that A’s autonomy-related interests are relevantly affected only (i) if someone is 
interfering with A’s ability to make autonomous decisions, e.g. by brainwashing 
or propaganda, or by placing A in a relationship of domination or exploitation; 
or (ii) if unjust or unjustified laws wrong A by forcing A to do particular things, 
even if such laws do not interfere with A’s general ability to be autonomous.
In sum, people’s objective interests – not their subjective preferences – 
are what justifies democratic enfranchisement under AAP. But when people 
get participation rights, they are obviously free to express and pursue their 
subjective preferences, and to hold democratic representatives accountable for 
making decisions contrary to their interests. This does not guarantee that their 
interests will in fact be protected ex post, but enfranchisement is a necessary 
feature of any account of democratic interest protection. If securing particular 
outcomes was all that mattered, a benevolent dictator could protect morally 
significant interests – but this would not be sufficient from the perspective of 
a democratic argument such as AAP. AAP’s primary purpose as a principle of 
democratic enfranchisement is to realise the democratic value of procedural 
fairness when it comes to the consideration and protection of morally weighty 
interests. This claim is compatible with the view that achieving just outcomes 
may require much more: a democratic principle alone, such as AAP, cannot 
possibly – and does not have to – guarantee just outcomes.
8  Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 372 ff.
9  Ibid.
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Interests, Rights, and the Detriment Test
Most existing accounts of AAP do not explicitly draw on the interest theory 
of rights in order to justify why affected interests justify participation rights. 
This is surprising, since that theory offers a helpful – albeit controversial10 – 
normative framework. Raz’s influential definition of the interest theory states 
that ‘“X has a right” if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of X’s wellbeing (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding 
some other person(s) to be under a duty.’11 
While this thought is a natural starting point for AAP supporters, it is not 
immediately obvious why exactly a person’s relevantly affected interests are 
sufficient for justifying that person’s democratic enfranchisement, and thus, 
why a demos might be in breach of a duty by failing to confer democratic 
participation rights to that person. In other words, what is lost when we fail to 
confer democratic participation rights to people whose morally weighty interests 
are affected: under which conditions would doing so be to their detriment?12 
First, a failure to confer democratic participation rights to a relevantly affected 
person A places A in a condition of vulnerability, such that A lacks a democratic 
enforcement mechanism for obtaining the consideration of her interests 
during decision-making. This is detrimental to A even if A’s interests were not 
adversely affected in the first place.13 Second, a failure to confer democratic 
participation rights constitutes an expressivist wrong against affected persons, 
who are owed a public acknowledgement of their equal status in a democratic 
state. Third, a failure to confer democratic participation rights is detrimental 
to A because A’s inclusion in democratic procedures would improve other 
democratic agents’ knowledge about the nature of A’s interests and preferences, 
thus improving the quality of democratic deliberations. For these three reasons, 
a relevantly affected person’s detriment is sufficient for justifying the conferral 
of democratic participation rights. Of course, the abstract right of democratic 
participation justified by AAP can instantiate itself in different forms, such as 
the concrete right to vote, or the concrete right to engage in peaceful protest. 
Which set of concrete rights specific persons who are enfranchised under AAP 
hold respectively depends on the particular ways in which their interests are 
affected.
10  Offering a full defence of the interest theory of rights is beyond the scope of this paper.
11  Raz (1986), p. 166.
12   Matthew Kramer has proposed a somewhat similar, but much more general, ‘detriment test’ in the context of legal 
rights: ‘If and only if at least one minimally sufficient set of facts includes the undergoing of a detriment by some 
person Q at the hands of some other person R who bears a duty under the contract or norm, Q holds a right — 
correlative to that duty — under the contract or norm’ (Matthew H. Kramer, “Refining the Interest Theory of Rights,” 
The American Journal of Jurisprudence 55, no. 1 (2010): 36-37).
13  I elaborate on cases of this kind in the next section. 
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What Does It Mean to Be Affected?
What does ‘being affected’ mean in the context of AAP? As I will argue, actual 
and possible coercion,14 exploitation, and reciprocity form a set of cases in 
which a person A is relevantly affected by a polity in the context of AAP, such 
that each one of these cases is sufficient for establishing that AAP is relevantly 
affected. Those cases pass the detriment test, because all of them are cases in 
which participation rights are necessary for protecting A’s relevant interests. 
 My arguments in this section show why, in order for A to have participation 
rights, A’s interests in autonomy or wellbeing must not only be affected, but 
they must also be affected in a certain way. My arguments also show that many 
relevant types of ‘being affected’ occur within economic relationships.
Actual Coercion
When we say that ‘B coerces A,’ we typically have a situation in mind where B 
changes the range of choices that A has in order to induce A to act in particular 
way. More specifically, when B coerces A, B restricts A’s autonomy – while 
not necessarily restricting the amount of A’s options – in such a way that A 
complies with B’s directives even though A would not have freely chosen to do 
so. In my view, B is able to do so if B communicates a credible and non-trivial 
threat to A.15 I say ‘while not necessarily restricting the amount of A’s options’ 
here because although some coercive threats may eliminate certain options 
altogether, other coercive threats do not. They simply make certain options 
costly – and sometimes prohibitively so – for the coercee. By ‘credible,’ I mean 
threats issued to coercees whose compliance can be tracked and enforced by 
a coercer. By ‘non-trivial,’ I mean threats that impose significant costs for 
noncompliance on the coercee. 
Coercion cases pass the detriment test because coercee A cannot be certain 
that the coercer will respect and promote her relevant interest in autonomy 
fully. Here, participation rights are necessary – although possibly not sufficient 
– for protecting A’s interest in autonomy. In those cases, A is entitled to 
participation rights because having those rights gives A the opportunity to have 
a say in how a demos D may restrict her interest in autonomy. If a polity fails to 
14   By incorporating coercion cases, AAP is able to subsume all cases included by a rival solution to the democratic 
boundary problem: the all-subjected principle (ASP). In contrast to ASP, however, AAP supporters can show that there 
are cases in which non-coercively affected interests justify participation rights. For influential discussions of ASP, 
see Arash Abizadeh, ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders,’ 
Political Theory 36 (2008), pp. 37-65; Robert Goodin, ‘Enfranchising all subjected, worldwide,’ International Theory 
8/ 3 (2016), 365-389; David Miller, ‘Democracy’s Domain,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 37/3 (2009), 201-228; 
Laura Valentini, ‘No Global Demos, No Global Democracy? A Systemization and Critique,’ Perspectives on Politics 
12/4 (2014), 789-807. 
15   For discussion of why credible threats must be coercive, see Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 
Volume 3, Harm to Self (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 198. For an account of the non-
triviality criterion, see Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 127. 
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confer participation rights to coercee A, the polity wrongfully breaches its duty, 
which would be detrimental to A.
Possible Coercion: Non-enforcement and Domination
What if a demos B refrains from exercising coercion over A, but could choose 
to do so at any given time? A would make her decisions in such a way that 
takes the possibility of coercion by B into account, and would probably choose 
differently than she otherwise would. Unlike in case of actual coercion, B does 
not explicitly change A’s range of options by communicating coercive threats to 
A. But in possible coercion cases, A still has to take into consideration how B 
might possibly change her range of options as a response to how A chooses to 
act. It is for that reason that A’s interests are relevantly affected in a similar way 
when A is possibly coerced, compared to when A is actually coerced. 
The first type of possible coercion is non-enforcement. This case occurs when 
states choose not to enforce certain laws, for example because potential offences 
of law X are too insignificant to justify the cost of enforcing X. The function 
of legal systems that govern our conduct is not only to coerce us; they also 
impose duties and exercise social power.16 Often the presence of the latter two 
is sufficient for ensuring compliance, which is why coercion is only exercised 
selectively in some cases. In cases without actual coercion, we would not be 
inclined to say that the subjects of particular laws or policies are not coerced 
by the entity that chooses not to exercise coercion in a specific case. Therefore, 
we must incorporate the concept of possible coercion into our understanding of 
what it means to be relevantly affected.17
The second type of possible coercion is domination.18 An entity with coercive 
power dominates A if it has the prerogative of arbitrarily deciding if, when, 
and how it will interfere coercively in A’s affairs. This prerogative is ‘arbitrary’ 
in domination cases because the subjects have no say in how the prerogative 
to interfere is exercised.19 Examples of domination which are particularly 
relevant for justifying participation rights under AAP include cases in which 
non-resident non-citizens who live at the border of a demos, or on a territory 
that the demos occupies or intends to occupy, are under non-trivial threat of 
16  Leslie Green, ‘The Forces of Law: Duty, Coercion and Power,’ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, 12 (2015), p. 15
17   Of course, not all cases of non-enforcement qualify as forms of coercion which affect one’s interest in autonomy and 
wellbeing in a morally significant, non-trivial way. Predictable, non-arbitrary forms of non-enforcement of the kinds 
of laws which are designed to impose minor sanctions for relatively small transgressions are excluded on this account, 
because such cases would not meet the detriment test. 
18   For discussions of the relevance of domination for AAP, see David Owen, ‘Constituting the Polity, Constituting the 
Demos: On the Place of the All Affected Interests Principle in Democratic Theory and in Resolving the Democratic 
Boundary Problem,’ Ethics and Global Politics 5/3 (2012), 129-152, pp. 140-3; Ludvig Beckman and Jonas Hultin 
Rosenberg, ‘Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion,’ Res Publica (2017), 1-18.
19   As Pettit puts it, ‘A will be dominated in a certain choice by […] B, to the extent that B has a power of interfering in 
the choice that is not itself controlled by A.’ Philipp Pettit, On the Peoples Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 50.
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coercion by that demos. One may worry – in my view rightly – that giving a 
dominated group of persons who are at risk of annexation participation rights in 
the decisions of the dominating group will not make this instance of domination 
any less wrong. AAP can easily accommodate this worry, however, because AAP 
is not committed to the view that enfranchisement is sufficient for protecting 
all affected interests. AAP simply determines the correct scope of democratic 
enfranchisement, but it cannot help us identify which other rights – such as veto 
rights, a right of self-defence, or a right to reparation and redistribution – are 
necessary for achieving an all-things-considered just state of affairs. In the case 
outlined here, annexation as an instance of domination would clearly remain 
morally wrong even if AAP is implemented and the annexed are enfranchised. 
This conclusion is compatible with my modest interpretation of AAP. Not 
enfranchising the annexed would simply constitute an added wrong on top of 
the already existing wrong of annexation.
Exploitation
Exploitation is not a straightforwardly coercive situation. Unlike coercers, 
exploiters typically make an offer to the exploitee rather than threatening 
her. In doing so, exploiters may change the payoffs of certain options,20 or 
actually add new options – albeit not necessarily good ones. Exploitation 
is neither exclusively nor primarily wrong because it restricts exploitees’ 
autonomy; exploitation cases pass the detriment test because exploiters take 
unfair advantage of exploitees, so that exploitees are wronged even if being 
exploited benefits them.21 Therefore, exploitees need a democratic enforcement 
mechanism in order to protect their interests. The irrelevance of coercion for 
justifying participation rights in exploitation cases implies that even some non-
resident non-citizens who are not subject to actual or possible coercion by a 
particular polity ought to be enfranchised in that polity. Of course, exploitees 
may be owed more than just participation rights. They may also, for example, 
have a right to benefitting from a redistribution of goods and services in 
accordance with principles of fairness. Analogous to my earlier points about the 
wrongness of domination, however, fully rectifying the wrongs of exploitation 
all-things-considered is beyond the scope of AAP.
Reciprocity
Participants of reciprocal projects are often heavily invested in them, and they 
are not less invested just because they enter such projects voluntarily and not 
20  Ruth J. Sample, Exploitation: What It Is and Why Its Wrong (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 11.
21   Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Volume 4, Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 176; see also Robert E. Goodin, ‘Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person’ Essex Papers in 
Politics and Government, no. 22 (1985). 
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coercively. Their autonomy and wellbeing often depend on the continuous, 
reliable success of reciprocal relationships for a foreseeable time frame.
Let us consider a few examples of affected non-citizens engaging in a reciprocal 
project with a demos and its members. The most obvious case encompasses 
both resident citizens and resident non-citizens, such as migrant workers, 
who ordinarily work, pay taxes and derive benefits such as free basic health 
care. But consider also non-resident non-citizens, who may be in a reciprocal 
relationship with a demos B if they are members of another demos which has 
entered into a trade agreement with B. Furthermore, resident non-citizens who 
are not permitted to work in B and thus do not pay taxes in B, such as asylum-
seekers, may still partake in the reciprocal sharing of benefits and burdens 
with the members of B. At first sight, it seems impossible for asylum-seekers to 
do so even though they may want to, given that many countries impose strict 
employment restrictions. In the UK, for example, asylum-seekers are normally 
prohibited from working until they are officially granted asylum.22 Yet there 
is more to reciprocity than taking on paid work and paying taxes. Engaging in 
activities such as care work and volunteer work for charities, churches, or NGOs 
also means that one partakes in the sharing of burdens by devoting personal 
resources to an activity that benefits the larger public.23 
Why do reciprocity cases pass the detriment test? Is it not compensation 
enough for contributing to the sharing of burdens if A receives the benefits of 
a reciprocal relationship – why would A be entitled to additional participation 
rights, purely in virtue of her reciprocal activities? While I agree that A is indeed 
fairly compensated in cases of fair reciprocity, the function of participation rights 
is not compensation – rather, it is the democratic enforcement of a continuous 
consideration of all relevant interests. In order for reciprocity to be entirely 
fair, the terms on which reciprocal relationships operate must not only be fair 
in the present (t1), but there must be mutual assurances that they will remain 
fair in the foreseeable future at t2, t3 and so on. Our interest in autonomy and 
wellbeing is not adversely affected by reciprocal relationships, but it is still 
affected. Reciprocal partners have a stake in deliberating and deciding together 
on the terms of an on-going cooperation, and especially in deciding how this 
cooperation may affect their fundamental interests in autonomy and wellbeing 
– even if the terms of the trade agreement were initially negotiated fairly and by 
22   Immigration Rules 2014 (United Kingdom), §344B and §360 (2014), <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-
rules/immigration-rules-part-11-asylum > (Accessed: 30 January 2018).
23   Of course, resident non-citizens are not only relevantly affected via reciprocity in this case, but also more 
straightforwardly via coercion. Either type of affectedness is sufficient for justifying enfranchisement, and if several 
types of affectedness are present, this is not a problem for my account. In fact, it is important to identify exactly in 
what way a person is relevantly affected, because those affected both by coercion and reciprocity may well need a 
different set of concrete participation rights in order to democratically enforce the consideration of their interests 
than those affected exclusively by coercion. 
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legitimate institutions. Fair reciprocity thus also entails a reciprocity of public 
justification, and this is only possible if all reciprocal partners have participation 
rights. In light of this, it would be to the detriment of reciprocal partners not to 
have participation rights which protect their relevant interests.
Economic Participation Rights: Substitutes, Supplements, Constraints
In the previous two sections, I have developed one version of AAP, which justifies 
why affected persons have an abstract right to participation. If we accept that 
version, what does this view commit us to regarding the question of how this 
abstract right instantiates itself in various concrete forms?
Existing versions of AAP focus primarily on the distribution of the concrete 
right to vote. To some extent, an emphasis on voting may be justified. After all, 
voting is a particularly tangible marker of enfranchisement: its use is confined 
to discrete and foreseeable moments in time, its scope is normally equal for 
each rights-holder, and its content is relatively uncontroversial. But focussing 
exclusively on voting obscures the fact that democratic enfranchisement also 
includes a variety of other types of political participation, such as running 
for political office, participating in a legal peaceful protest, or engaging in 
civil disobedience. If AAP is supposed to provide a full account of democratic 
enfranchisement, it needs to explicitly incorporate a range of qualitatively 
different concrete instantiations of the right to participate in democratic 
decisions. But if we accept the general idea that AAP is compatible with different 
concrete instantiations of participatory rights, we also need to question whether 
all of these instantiations must be political participation rights – particularly 
if many kinds of relevant affectedness, such as exploitation and reciprocity, 
occur partially or primarily within economic relationships. What if there 
are circumstances in which other forms of democratic participation, such as 
economic participation, protect the interests of all those enfranchised under 
AAP in a better way? In such circumstances, AAP would demand the conferral 
of economic participation rights alongside, or instead of, political participation 
rights, depending on the specific context.24
The kind of economic participation that I have in mind here is a set of practices 
that involve the use of public and private economic resources to influence political 
decisions, as well as a set of practices that contribute to political decision-making 
24   Carol Gould makes a similar claim when developing her own account of AAP: ‘I […] propose that we take one meaning 
of being affected as given by human rights, where these rights include not only the mostly negative civil and political 
rights but also the more full-bodied social and economic rights.’ Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human 
Rights, p. 212.
GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (10/2) 2017 
ISSN: 1835-6842
11ANNETTE ZIMMERMANN
regarding the distribution and use of public and private economic resources.25 
This is a deliberately broad definition of democratic economic participation. It 
is broader than the kinds of economic participation typically discussed in the 
literature on economic democracy, which focuses – for instance – on workplace 
democracy, unionisation, or the self-management of workers in co-operatives. 
These kinds of participatory practices aim at democratising existing economic 
institutions, such as the workplace. The question in that debate is: who has the 
right to participate in decisions within an economic enterprise? But settling 
this question is not sufficient for supporters of AAP: we also need to ask how we 
ought to distribute economic participation rights in a given democratic polity.
Economic participation rights: the set of rights X
E
 which enable 
their holder A to participate in democratic decisions either by using 
economic resources to voice political preferences of any kind (e.g. 
boycotts, campaign funding); or by voicing political preferences 
specifically about the use of economic resources,26 either within 
an economic relationship (e.g. strikes in a corporation) or within a 
political forum (e.g. participatory budgeting in a public assembly).
If we understand concrete X
E
 in this way, under which circumstances does 
the abstract right to participation justified by AAP instantiate itself in this 
form? My claim is that they do so whenever the morally significant interests in 
autonomy and wellbeing cannot be adequately protected without concrete X
E
, 
or whenever relevant interests can be protected better via X
E
 than via political 
participation rights X
P
 alone.
Substitutes
Having clarified what X
E
 are, let us now consider how X
E
 can possibly work 
in conjunction with political participation rights to protect morally significant 
interests. There are at least three cases which seem prima facie plausible. It 
seems that X
E
 may, first, serve to achieve the same ends as political participation 
rights do, so that they act as a substitute. Even though political and economic 
participation rights are qualitatively different, and may thus be incommensurable 
in certain cases, there are cases in which they may serve the same purpose for 
the prospective rights-holder. 
25   X
E
 thus differ from standard economic liberties exercised in the private realm for a private (non-political) purpose, 
such as ‘working, transacting, holding, and using’ (see James Nickel, ‘Economic Liberties’ in The Idea of a Political 
Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, ed. Victoria Davion (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 155-76, pp. 156 f). 
However, political decisions about the scope of such economic liberties may well fall into the domain of X
E
.
26   One may wonder why these kinds of rights are not simply political participation rights X
P
. The point is that the 
scope of these rights is restricted to a specific domain, which alters the substantive content of these rights, and thus 
makes them conceptually different from standard X
P
. But note that even if one rejects my claim that there is a clear 
conceptual boundary between X
E
 and X
P
, one can accept the more general claim (which is compatible with my view) 
that, since our interests are significantly affected by decisions over economic resources, a commitment to AAP entails 
a commitment to the view that we ought to grant affected persons a whole range of rights over those decisions, both 
by expanding the scope of X
P
, and by expanding the scope of X
E
. I thank Cécile Fabre for this point.
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Substitute: Either X
E
 or X
P
 protect A’s morally relevant interests 
sufficiently and equally well.
To see how X
E
 could act as a substitute for X
P
, consider, for example, 
participatory budgeting: residents meet in neighbourhood assemblies to 
deliberate on the community’s needs, and subsequently appoint community 
representatives who make decisions about the allocation of those funds, as well 
as about future investment priorities. Thus, participatory budgeting integrates 
the exercise of political participation rights X
P
 into a decision-making process 
specifically concerned with the use and distribution of economic resources. 
Here, participatory budgeting functions as a genuine substitute only if other, 
more general political participation rights, such as the right to vote in federal 
elections, are unavailable to the holder of the right to engage in participatory 
budgeting. This does not necessarily imply that the holder of this right would 
be indifferent between having X
P
 or X
E
; it simply means that X
E
 can, in this 
limited decision-making domain, fulfil a sufficiently similar function as more 
standard X
P
.
Participatory budgeting is a comparatively young democratic innovation: 
first developed in the late 1980s in Porto Alegre, Brazil, it was subsequently 
adopted in 1,500 cities across the world by 2012.27 One of the reasons for this 
is its relative success in securing better outcomes than conventional models 
of political participation: in Porto Alegre, for example, participatory budgeting 
successfully increased participation by traditionally non-participating citizens.28 
Furthermore, exercising standard political rights had been ineffective in 
securing an accountable and fair use of public resources in light of a historical 
background of deeply entrenched political corruption. Participatory budgeting, 
by contrast, gave residents direct control over the means to provide key public 
services and basic infrastructure, such as widespread access to water services 
and to more public schools.29 This track record suggests that the right to engage 
in participatory budgeting helps protect the kind of affected interests that are 
relevant for AAP more directly than standard political participation rights 
such as voting in local or federal elections, and may thus be a better substitute. 
Even if the same positive outcomes could have been achieved via the exercise 
of X
P
 – assuming that the background problem of corruption could have been 
tackled otherwise – this kind of economic participation is more direct and 
27   Ernesto Ganuza and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, ‘The Power of Ambiguity: How Participatory Budgeting Travels the Globe,’ 
Journal of Public Deliberation 8/2 (2012).
28   Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 
p. 39.
29   Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, ‘Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance,’ in Archon Fung and 
Erik Olin Wright (eds.), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance 
(London: Verso, 2003), p. 5
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more accountable.30 In addition, participatory budgeting is a positive model 
for a ‘second-best’ enfranchisement of relevantly affected resident non-citizens 
via X
E
 if standard X
P
 are unavailable to them. If X
E
 do function as a genuine 
substitute in this case – and this case may be admittedly rare31 – then from the 
perspective of AAP, non-citizens are not being wronged by not having X
P
.
How does a traditionally local practice like participatory budgeting enhance 
transnational democratic inclusion? Empirically, the right to contribute to 
participatory budgeting is usually conferred to residents. But the fact that 
transnational participatory budgeting which includes non-resident non-citizens 
is not an empirical reality (yet) is not decisive for this argument: the point is 
that, from the perspective of AAP, transnational participatory budgeting would 
be desirable if it could substitute or supplement political participation rights 
conferred to non-resident non-citizens in accordance with AAP. Transnational 
participatory budgeting could be implemented, for instance, in the context of 
local cross-border decision-making concerning the protection of public goods, 
such as environmental protection policies: several municipalities (M1, M2, 
… Mn) located in the same region, but divided by a national border, could 
implement a joint participatory budgeting scheme, which would thus grant 
persons who are neither residents nor citizens of M1 participation rights in M1. 
This would be justifiable according to AAP, provided that the interests of the 
enfranchised groups in M1, M2, … Mn are relevantly affected.
Supplements
Second, economic participation rights may supplement political participation 
rights by amplifying their scope. As supplements, economic participation rights 
protect relevant interests indirectly by adding an enforcement mechanism for 
the impact of political participation rights, thus increasing their potency. 
Supplement: Possession of either X
E
 or X
P
 protects A’s morally relevant 
interests sufficiently, but possession of both X
E
 and X
P
 amplifies the 
scope and/or political impact of each one of those rights.
For instance, simply voting for a political party that wants to improve fair 
working conditions in transnational corporations may well suffice in some 
cases for protecting vulnerable interests of workers – depending on whether 
the party succeeds, of course. But if members of the same constituency that 
30   Another added benefit is informing and mobilising the wider public: as Goodin argues, ‘[b]eyond informing 
policymakers, deliberative mini-publics can play an important role in informing fellow citizens about what they might 
themselves think about the matter, had they the same opportunity to study and discuss the matter intensively with 
one another.’ Robert E. Goodin, Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative 
Turn, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008), p. 268.
31   Whenever participatory budgeting does not function as a genuine substitute, it is best construed as a special case of 
a supplement which integrates both X
E
 and X
P
 and is designed in a way that maximise the ability of rights-holders to 
access, and to actually exercise, such rights. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
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would vote for the political party also engage in a transnational solidarity 
strike, this will amplify the impact of their vote, because the party can then 
demonstrate that the issue of fair working conditions is a widely shared concern 
and thus subject to public scrutiny. There are many transnational examples of 
solidarity strikes which aim to increase political pressure. For instance, when 
the Latvian building company Laval un Partneri Ltd won a school renovation 
contract from the Swedish government, it employed Latvian workers, but paid 
them significantly less than local Swedish workers would ordinarily earn.32 In 
solidarity with the Latvian workers, the Swedish Building Workers’ Union asked 
Laval Ltd to sign their collective agreement, and when the company refused, 
the union joined forces with the Swedish Electricians Union to engage in strike 
action, thus effectively blocking the company from doing business in Sweden. In 
cases like these, the exercise of economic participation rights clearly increases 
the likelihood of adequate interest protection for relevantly affected citizens 
and non-citizens, even if political participation alone could be sufficient.
In both the first case (substitutes) and the second one (supplements), AAP 
may not demand the conferral of X
E
, if morally relevant interests are protected 
sufficiently via X
P
. However, in non-ideal conditions, this may not often be the 
case: it is often costly, impractical, and sometimes just impossible to create 
the kinds of institutions that would be needed in order for all affected persons 
to be able to exercise X
P
. X
E
 would be a feasible, and thus better, alternative 
to standard X
P
 under those circumstances. And if X
E
 are the only or best way 
to protect morally relevant interests under non-ideal conditions, then their 
conferral is morally required by AAP. Similarly, even if feasibility constraints 
are not a concern, AAP may demand the conferral of X
E
. In non-ideal conditions 
where a group’s exercise of X
P
 gets systematically ignored, so that the group 
finds itself in a persistent minority, the group may need an added enforcement 
mechanism in order to ensure equal concern for the interests of its members. 
X
E
 may provide such an enforcement mechanism. So, in sum, AAP demands 
the conferral of X
E
 – when X
E
 are either substitutes or supplements for X
P
 – if 
X
P
 either cannot be exercised for feasibility reasons, or if X
P
 are ineffective for 
interest protection.33
Constraints
Consider now a third, and last, possibility: X
E
 may act as a constraint on X
P
 – 
both on the X
P
 of others, and on one’s own X
P
. 
32   For the details of this case, see the European Court of Justice ruling in Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (2007) C-341/05, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= 
CELEX%3A62005CJ0341> (Accessed: 1 January 2018). The ruling was widely criticised for overemphasising 
business interests, which again successfully increased political pressure to adequately consider the fundamental 
interests of workers.
33  If those conditions do not apply, the conferral of X
E
 is still morally permissible, but not required.
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Constraint: A’s X
E
 constrains the exercise of a right X
P
 in a way that 
enhances the protection of A’s interests.
Regarding the former, X
E
 may act as a countervailing power to X
P
, as ‘a variety 
of mechanisms that reduce, and perhaps even neutralize, the power-advantages 
of ordinarily powerful actors.’34 Consider a strike by persons – citizens or non-
citizens – who are relevantly affected for the purposes of AAP because they 
are being exploited. Given that a relationship of exploitation is present, this 
suggests a clear power advantage of the exploiter, in which case expressions of 
the political preference not to be exploited may well remain inconsequential. 
A strike, however, may give exploiters a tangible incentive to enter into a 
negotiation with exploitees; and the exploitees’ power to strike allows them to 
place credible demands on the exploiter during that negotiation process. For 
a transnational example of this, consider a well-known EU labour law case, 
The International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF) and The Finnish 
Seamens Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti (2007).35 Finnish 
company Viking Line ABP operated a ship between Finland and Estonia, which 
it attempted to ‘reflag’ as Estonian in order to avoid having to pay its workers 
Finnish wages instead of lower Estonian wages. Here, the company’s aim clearly 
seems to have been to take unfair advantage of their workers’ labour, which is 
why the workers’ interests count as relevantly affected by exploitation according 
to the version of AAP developed above. When ITWF and its local partners 
jointly planned strike action, the company sought an injunction against them 
in UK courts, and even though England and Wales’s High Court granted the 
injunction, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales ultimately overturned it. 
However, when this case was referred to the European Court of Justice, the ECJ 
ruled in favour of the company. But since this ruling was widely condemned for 
prioritising business interests over the basic interests of workers, it still had a 
significant political impact by triggering public debate about the transnational 
right to strike as a strategy for opposing exploitative working conditions in 
transnationally operating companies.
Regarding the latter, consider the recent history of US campaign finance law 
about Political Action Committees (PACs) run by unions and corporations. The 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (better known as the McCain-Feingold 
Act) prohibited solicitation of contributions from non-union-members.36 What 
does this mean for the relationship between X
E
 and X
P
? Members of these kinds 
34   Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, ‘Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance,’ in Archon Fung 
and Erik Olin Wright (eds.), Deepening Democracy (London: Verso, 2003), p. 260.
35   The details of this European Court of Justice case are available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62005CJ0438> (Accessed: 1 January 2018).
36   Note that this particular provision was struck down by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310 
(2010).
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of PACs have exercised their X
P
 by forming and joining associations (in this case, 
a union or corporation, and a PAC), and they express their political preferences 
through those associations, but their use of campaign finance-related X
E
 is 
restricted to soliciting financial contributions from union members only. So the 
exercise of X
E
 constrains the scope in which one’s own X
P
 may be exercised.37 
From the perspective of AAP, these kinds of X
E
 could justifiably also be accorded 
to relevantly affected non-citizens – for instance, resident non-citizens who are 
union members. However, when it comes to according this right to non-resident 
non-citizens, the case is likely to become more complex: while campaign 
contributions by foreigners are not impermissible as a matter of principle from 
the perspective of AAP, they do need to be balanced against principles of justice: 
even if AAP would justify the conferral of a right to engage in transnational 
campaign funding to a non-resident non-citizen, this right might be overridden 
by potentially weightier justice-based concerns about disproportionate foreign 
interference in a polity’s political decision-making landscape, especially if they 
undermine the integrity of that polity’s existing democratic institutions. 
Having outlined these three relationships, it is useful to reflect on what I am 
not claiming. First, I am not committing myself to the view that X
E
 always, and 
only, interact with X
P
 in these three ways: I have neither tried to claim that X
E
 
necessarily fulfil these functions, nor have I attempted to offer an exhaustive 
list of possible relationships between X
P
 and X
E
. Second, my account is not 
incompatible with the view that one and the same right of economic participation 
may fulfil more than one of the three functions: boycotts and strikes, for instance, 
may be both supplements and constraints. Third, I am not denying that persons 
who do not count as relevantly affected from the perspective of the AAP can 
have X
E
 as well. It may well be possible to justify X
E
 for the unaffected – but 
such a justification could obviously not be based on affected interests, which is 
why I will not discuss this possibility in detail here.
In sum, my modest aim in this section has simply been to point out that X
E
 can 
act as substitutes, supplements, or constraints on X
P
, and that this important 
type of transnational enfranchisement is currently heavily underexplored in the 
literature on AAP. Whenever this is the case, X
P
 are not necessarily the only 
way, and not necessarily the best way, to protect the kinds of morally relevant 
interests that count as relevant for the AAP. So it is exactly in these cases that 
AAP justifies the conferral of X
E
 to persons – citizens as well as non-citizens, 
residents as well as non-residents – whose interests are relevantly affected.
37   Of course, in this case, in addition to acting as a constraint on one’s other rights X
P
, the economic participation right 
X
E
 is also constrained itself, most importantly by relevant legislation concerning PACs. 
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Constraining Duties: Accountability and No International Misuse
There is one important worry about including economic participation rights X
E
 
in the set of rights conferred to affected persons in accordance with AAP. Even 
if AAP plausibly justifies an ex ante distribution of concrete X
E  
in a similar way 
to which it justifies the distribution of concrete political participation rights 
X
P
, the full extent of X
E
’s ex post impact may be much less tangible than the 
impact of exercising X
P
. X
E
 which involve voluntary (non-)exchanges of private 
economic resources, particularly campaign funding and boycotting, are likely 
have a political impact that is hard to track, simply because voluntary private 
economic relationships and transactions are subject to public scrutiny to a much 
lesser extent than those within the public domain. Furthermore, in a globalised 
economy, those private economic relationships are often subject to overlapping 
and potentially conflicting laws governing the exercise of X
E
. In light of these 
factors, it is therefore difficult to determine which holders of X
E
 ought to be 
held accountable for any detrimental impact of X
E  
being exercised,
 
and to which 
constituency they ought to be accountable to. 
If X
E
 are particularly hard to track in this way, it is plausible to think that their 
exercise is constrained by a number of duties.38 First, rights-holders need to be 
accountable for how they use or do not use their X
E
 by publicly justifying their 
actions to other holders of affected interests. Second, rights-holders have a duty 
not to intentionally and foreseeably misuse their X
E
 in a way that adversely affects 
the interests of others. My claim here is that any plausible version of AAP must 
be compatible with the imposition of at least these two minimal duties, because 
without them, the participation rights conferred in accordance with AAP cannot 
be used as an adequately strong democratic enforcement mechanism for the 
consideration of the affected interests that they are supposed to help protect.
Deliberative Accountability via Public Justification
How can private individuals be held accountable for the ways in which they 
use their participation rights? Standard, ‘narrow’ models of democratic 
accountability focus on holding elected representatives accountable for their 
decisions. Holders of participation rights can hold such representatives 
accountable via electoral sanctions, for example by choosing other candidates in 
the next election. ‘Wide’ conceptions of accountability, by contrast, emphasise 
the accountability of a broader set of democratic actors, including unelected 
38   These duties are not necessarily specific to X
E
, for they may plausibly apply to the exercise of other rights as well. For 
instance, consider countries where voting (and thus the exercise of a particular X
P
) is compulsory, such as Luxembourg 
or Peru: here, the exercise of X
P
 correlates with a duty incurred by the holder of X
P
 to exercise this right in a particular 
way. Nevertheless, it is important to examine how exactly these duties play out in the context of X
E
.
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individual rights-holders who participate via X
E
 and X
P
.39 Holding such actors 
accountable via sanctions is hardly possible, unless they intentionally misuse 
their participation rights. But they can be asked to justify deliberatively how 
they make use of their opportunities of impact on a polity’s decisions, and their 
respective effect on the morally relevant interests of others.40 This allows us to 
think about duties of democratic accountability held by non-elected political 
actors, and particularly those exercising their X
E
 outside of state institutions. 
Thus, the ‘wide’ model of accountability is particularly useful for understanding 
the specific duties that plausibly constrain X
E
, although similar duties may of 
course also plausibly constrain standard X
P
.
To illustrate how this duty works in practice, consider participatory budgeting, 
where resident citizens and resident non-citizens use X
E
 to self-select into a 
deliberative process regarding the use of public resources in a way that protects 
the interests of residents. The participants of participatory budgeting processes 
have to justify their decisions to each other and to the wider public. They also 
have to publicly justify why they are the right person to participate in this kind of 
decision-making, for example by demonstrating a basic competency regarding 
the issues being discussed.41 
Of course, the scope of the justificatory group may increase dramatically, and 
to an unforeseeable extent, with the conferral of X
E
. This raises the question of 
whether we can always know who our duties of accountability are directed at. 
The brief answer is: we cannot, and this is not necessarily a reason to be sceptical 
of AAP. AAP offers us conceptual tools for an ex post evaluation of democratic 
participation: AAP does not only determine who has duties of accountability, 
but it also shows when and why democratic actors have breached a duty of 
accountability. Hence, the issue of the unforeseeable political impact of X
E
 
simply highlights a feature of AAP, not a bug.
One final question remains: do the holders of X
E
 incur these duties only if 
they actually exercise their rights? This would be plausible if failing to exercise 
one’s participation rights never affected the interests of others. However, this 
is just not how economic participation rights work. Consider strike-breakers: 
a worker of company A choosing not to exercise their right to strike actively 
39   For an influential alternative to the sanctions model, see Jane Mansbridge, ‘A “Selection Model” of Political 
Representation,’ The Journal of Political Philosophy 17/4 (2009), 369-398. 
40  This does not mean, of course, that each X
E
-holder A must actually justify her use of X
E
 to each affected person every 
time A makes use of her X
E
. This would be overly demanding. Instead, A’s use of X
E
 must be justifiable – rather than 
actually justified – to the justificatory group, the latter of which can then challenge A to actually justify her use of X
E
 
ex post.
41  Note however that from the perspective of AAP, it is not the case that non-citizens, purely in virtue of their legal 
status, incur a special, more demanding duty of justification for their exercise of participation rights. Since AAP is a 
citizenship-independent account regarding the conferral of participation rights, it also offers a citizenship-independent 
account of correlative duties, so that ‘foreign influence’ is not intrinsically objectionable.
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undermines an on-going strike, and weakens the bargaining position of other 
holders of the right to strike. This adversely affects the interests of all strikers 
in A, including the strike-breaker’s. It may also adversely affect the interests 
of workers in a different organisation B, who do not have the right to strike in 
A but nevertheless have a stake in how successful the strikes in A turn out to 
be. Strikebreaking in A may set a bad precedent for future strikes in B. Hence, 
overall, it is more plausible to say that both acts (exercising one’s right to strike) 
and omissions (not exercising this right) trigger a duty of justification.
No Intentional Misuse of Economic Participation Rights
Secondly, holders of X
E
 incur a duty not to intentionally and foreseeably misuse 
their rights in a way that affects the interests of others in an unjust or exploitative 
way. The relevant interests here are the ones that count as morally relevant 
for the AAP, as outlined in section I of this paper: the interest in autonomy 
and wellbeing. The justification for this duty, again, is that AAP would be 
inconsistent if it demanded the conferral of rights, but allowed for these rights 
to be used in such a way that they undermine the very purpose for which they 
were conferred in the first place: the equal consideration and protection of 
fundamental interests. As Christiano rightly points out, ‘the ordinary exercise 
of liberal property rights can in some contexts constitute an exercise of political 
power that abridges political equality.’42
To illustrate more concretely how X
E
 can be intentionally misused in a way that 
breaches the duty outlined above, consider two kinds of boycotts, which both 
involve the use of private financial means in the context of private economic 
relations in a way that is intended to have a political impact: the transnational 
boycott of South African products in an effort to end Apartheid, and a boycott 
of the products of a company run by members of a particular social group (e.g. 
LGBTQ persons). The first kind of boycott is non-discriminatory, because its 
political aim is to combat injustice – specifically, racial injustice in South Africa 
– and because it is not targeted against persons or groups based on morally 
arbitrary criteria.43 The second boycott, in turn, is discriminatory, because it 
targets LGBTQ individuals simply in virtue of their sexual orientation, which is 
a morally arbitrary feature. As such, the aim of this boycott would be to further 
42   Thomas Christiano, ‘Political equality and the independent power of private property,’ in Problems for Democracy, 
ed. John H. Kultgen, Mary Lenzi (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2006), 119-138, p. 120.
43   My use of the term ‘morally arbitrary’ reflects standard terminology in the philosophical literature on discrimination. 
As David Miller puts it, ‘a morally arbitrary feature of persons is a feature that should not be allowed to affect the 
way they are treated,’ see David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2007), p. 32. 
For an extensive discussion of which features might qualify as arbitrary, see – amongst many others – Richard 
Arneson, ‘Discrimination, Disparate Impact, and Theories of Justice,’ in Sophia Moreau and Deborah Hellman (eds.), 
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 87-111. For critical discussion, see Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature of Discrimination (Oxford: OUP, 
2014), pp. 105 f.
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the social exclusion and disadvantage of LGBTQ persons, and thus to uphold 
an unjust state of affairs. Holders of the right to boycott have a duty not to 
intentionally use their right in this second way.44
Note that the duty specified here is not a duty of redistribution or 
compensation. If A’s exercise of X
E
 or X
P
 does turn out to be detrimental to B’s 
interests ex post, A may well be liable to compensatory measures – but those 
measures have to be justified by additional principles of justice and fairness. 
They cannot be justified internally by AAP because AAP determines the correct ex 
ante distribution of rights and correlative duties.
One may object that my account so far seems to imply a dramatically 
overdemanding duty, according to which we may never infringe on the interests 
of others by exercising X
E
. But recall that the AAP excludes trivial interests from 
consideration, so this duty is limited to infringements of fundamental interests 
in autonomy and wellbeing. Furthermore, given that we sometimes have to 
infringe even on such fundamental interests in order to pursue an even more 
important goal, this duty is best understood as a pro tanto duty, so that it may 
be permissibly overridden if that ensures an overall better protection of relevant 
affected interests.
Conclusion
This paper has made three contributions to the philosophical debate about the 
democratic enfranchisement of non-citizens. Firstly, I have developed a nuanced 
version of the all-affected principle (AAP), which clearly states what kinds of 
interests are morally relevant for AAP, what it means to be affected, and why 
being affected justifies an abstract right to democratic participation (sections 
I and II). My goal here has not been to defend AAP fully against competing 
solutions to the democratic boundary problem. Rather, I have tried to construct 
a plausible version of AAP that addresses some of the undertheorised aspects 
of existing versions of AAP, and then to show what this implies for possible 
views about concrete participation rights that AAP supporters must commit 
themselves to.
Secondly, I have argued that the abstract right justified by AAP instantiates 
itself not only as a cluster of concrete political participation rights, but also as 
a cluster of concrete economic participation rights (section III). These kinds of 
economic participation rights have been underacknowledged in the literature 
so far, but they are of crucial importance for AAP: there are important cases in 
44   This applies not only to boycotts where persons misuse their X
E
 collectively in order to achieve a shared goal, but also 
to individual instances of non-association. If the background conditions are such that a significant number of X
E
-
holders choose to engage in individual non-association, this may well have a political effect similar to the effects of a 
boycott.
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which relevant interests cannot be adequately protected without these rights, 
especially under non-ideal conditions. Therefore, those who commit themselves 
to AAP more generally must also commit themselves to the more specific view 
that AAP demands the conferral of concrete economic participation rights. 
In this context, I have identified ways in which economic participation rights 
substitute, supplement, and constrain political participation rights. 
I have concluded the paper by arguing, thirdly, that the exercise of concrete 
economic participation rights raises important worries about accountability 
and politial impact, and that their exercise must therefore be constrained by 
several duties (section IV).
One wider implication for future research is that, when it comes to 
understanding voice in the context of the democratic boundary problem, we 
ought to adopt a more multifaceted approach: rather than only analysing discrete 
instantiations of participation rights in isolation, and only focussing on standard 
political participation rights, we also ought to examine how the interplay between 
economic and political participation rights serves to protect valuable interests, 
and what kinds of duties constrain the exercise of such rights.45
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